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Abstract
This paper analyzes the relative efficiency of social spending and service delivery in 
Croatia by comparing social spending and key social (outcome) indicators in Croatia to 
those of comparator countries. The analysis finds evidence of significant inefficiencies 
in Croatia’s social spending, mainly related to inadequate cost recovery for health and 
education services, weaknesses in the financing mechanisms and institutional arrange-
ments, weak competition in the provision of social services, and weaknesses in targeting 
benefits. The paper also identifies areas for cost recovery and reform.
Keywords: Expenditure efficiency; health care spending; education spending; soci-
al protection spending
1 Introduction
The benefits of a further and significant reduction in the fiscal deficit in Croatia are 
well recognized. Moreover, fiscal adjustment will need to be led by rationalizing regular 
spending programs because the tax burden in Croatia is already one of the highest in the 
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region, and Croatia’s aspirations toward European Union (EU) membership suggest fu-
ture spending pressures.1 Expenditure-led fiscal adjustment will help to address Croatia’s 
large current account deficit, and maintain strong economic growth on a sustainable basis. 
At the same time, rationalizing spending is a key for enhancing the flexibility of fiscal po-
licy, a necessary ingredient for coping with shocks in the context of tightly managing the 
exchange rate. Indeed, in its latest Economic and Fiscal Policy Guidelines, the Ministry 
of Finance (MoF) projects a decline in general government spending of almost 6 percen-
tage points of GDP, just from 2007 to 2010.2   
A key policy issue is how to reduce the government-spending-to-GDP ratio, including 
by containing the cost of social services without undue sacrifices in quality. After all, so-
cial services constitute the largest share of total general government spending (more than 
half in 2005, the latest year for which data is available). Moreover, while Croatia’s per-
formance on health indicators has been better than most EU-10 countries, it is well behind 
most EU-15 countries, as discussed later in the paper, and Croatia’s education outcomes 
are lagging behind most EU-10 and EU-15 countries’3. Improving social indicators while 
containing costs requires greater efficiency of social spending.  
With this in mind, and to help identify areas for reform, this paper analyzes the relative 
efficiency of social spending in Croatia. It does so by comparing social spending and key 
social (outcome) indicators in Croatia to those of comparator countries.4 Relative effici-
ency is defined as the distance of a country’s observed input-output combination from an 
efficiency frontier. This frontier is estimated using so-called Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA, see Annex I) and represents the maximum attainable social outcome for a given 
input level (spending or intermediate output such as the number of hospital beds and the 
density of physicians). The efficiency of social spending in Croatia is evaluated against 
frontiers estimated for the EU-15, the EU-10, Cyprus, Malta, and OECD countries.5 
The analysis finds evidence of significant inefficiencies in Croatia’s social spending 
and therefore a significant potential to reduce government expenditure.  As discussed 
later, this potential could be realized by: (i) containing demand for social services by in-
troducing (or increasing the existing) fees for users of these services; (ii) reforming fi-
nance mechanisms for social spending; (iii) introducing greater competition in the provi-
1 This pressure is related to the use of EU structural funds, contributions to the EU budget, and an upgrading 
of environmental standards. Funck (2003) suggested that implementing National Programs for the Adoption of the 
Acquis of the new member states was going to entail  additional annual spending of (on average) about 3½ percent 
of GDP for these countries. Cucilić, Faulend, and Šošić (2004) estimated net fiscal costs (netting out transfers from 
the EU) of Croatia’s EU accession for 2007, the year the authors expected accession to take place at the time of writ-
ing, at 1.1 percent of GDP.
2 The projection does not include spending related to the use of EU structural funds.  
3 EU-10 countries are new EU members and comprise the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Lithua-
nia, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania. EU-15 countries comprise Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the Unit-
ed Kingdom.
4 Old-age pensions will not be a subject of this study, since this component of social spending does not lend itself 
to analysis of efficiency in the same way as the other components that are analyzed. 
5 The choice of comparator groups, the EU-10, EU-15, and OECD countries, is related to similarities in social 
infrastructure in Croatia and EU-10 countries, Croatia’s EU membership aspirations, and income level, respectively. 
To keep the discussion focused, Cyprus and Malta were not considered as a separate comparator group.          291
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sion of social services; (iv) improving the administration of social spending; and (v) tar-
geting benefits better. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II compares social spending and 
performance indicators in Croatia with those in other countries. Section III assesses effi-
ciency scores of key social spending categories, outlines possible explanatory factors for 
understanding cross-country differences in efficiency, and discusses potential reforms to 
enhance efficiency. Section IV concludes. 
2 International Comparisons of Social Spending and Performance 
The focus of this section is on three key areas, namely health care, education, and 
social protection (excluding pensions). As in Verhoeven et al. (2007), performance in-
dicators are divided into desired outcome and intermediate output indicators. Outcomes 
correspond to the underlying objectives sought by policy makers. Intermediate outputs 
are thought to be related to desired outcomes but can be more closely associated with cu-
rrent spending. The following indicators are used. 
Table 1 Croatia: Health Expenditure and Outcomesa
Total 
Expen-
diture
on Health 
(% of 
GDP)
Public 
Expen-
diture on 
Health 
(% of 
GDP)
Health 
Life 
Expectancy 
(years)
Standar-
dized Death 
Rates (per 
100.000 
people)
Infant 
Mortality 
Rate (per 
1.000 live 
births)
Child 
Mortality 
Rate (per 
1.000 live 
births)
Maternal 
Mortality 
Rate (per 
100.000 
live 
births)
Incidence
of 
Tuberculosis 
(per
100.000 
people)
Croatia 7.9 6.6 66.6 886.9 6.0 7.0 10.0 40.6
Bulgaria 7.7 4.3 64.6 1,056.4 12.0 15.0 32.0 39.0
Czech R. 7.2 6.6 68.4 837.6 3.0 4.0 9.0 10.4
Estonia 5.2 4.0 64.1 993.6 6.0 7.0 38.0 42.7
Hungary 7.9 5.6 64.9 1,015.5 7.0 8.0 11.0 21.7
Latvia 6.5 3.4 62.8 1,107.2 9.0 11.0 61.0 62.6
Lithuania 6.5 4.8 63.3 1,081.6 7.0 9.0 19.0 62.5
Poland 6.3 4.5 65.8 872.0 6.0 7.0 10.0 26.1
Romania 5.7 3.5 63.1 1,076.4 16.0 19.0 58.0 134.2
Slovak R. 6.1 5.4 66.2 945.0 7.0 8.0 10.0 17.0
Slovenia 8.9 6.8 69.5 729.4 3.0 4.0 17.0 14.6
EU-8 average 6.8 5.1 65.6 947.7 6.0 7.3 21.9 32.2
EU-10 average 6.8 4.9 65.3 971.5 7.6 9.2 26.5 43.1
EU-15 average 8.6 6.4 71.3 628.9 4.0 4.9 9.9 12.8
OECD average 8.7 6.3 70.7 672.2 4.3 5.3 9.5 15.4
a Spending data are averages for 2001-04. HALE data are for 2002. death rates are for the latest 
year available during 2001-05. infant and child mortality and incidence of tuberculosis are for 2005. 
an maternal mortality data are estimates for 2000.
Sources: WHO; and World Bank. World Development Indicators database.292
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•   Health care: The intermediate output indicators considered are the density of physi-
cians, pharmacists, and healthcare workers; the number of hospital beds; and the 
number of immunization vaccines. The key outcome variables include infant-, child-
, and maternal mortality rates; the standardized death rate from all causes per 1,000 
people, as defined by the World Health Organization (WHO); incidences of tuber-
culosis;6 and healthy average life expectancy (as defined by the WHO).  
•   Education: The key intermediate output indicators are primary pupil-teacher ratios, 
enrollment rates, rates of progression to secondary education, and graduation (com-
pletion) rates. The main outcome indicator is the average score on an international 
standardized test (PISA 2006) in mathematics (secondary education).  
•   Social protection: The key outcome indicator is poverty rates published by the OECD 
(data for Croatia are from the Croatian Central Bureau of Statistics, and may not be 
fully comparable to OECD data).  
2.1 Health Care
Health care in Croatia is mainly financed (around 90 percent) by the Croatian Heal-
th Insurance Institute (HZZO). Only a small share of the funding comes from other sour-
ces such as co-payments, informal patient payments and payments from other insurance 
companies. Payroll contributions are set at 15 percent of the gross wage. In addition, en-
terprises pay another ½ percent of wages for work-related injury insurance. 
In terms of health outcomes, Croatia has performed better than most countries with 
similar income levels. For example, in terms of healthy average life expectancy (HALE), 
Croatia has better results than all EU-10 countries (Table 1) except for Slovenia and the 
Czech Republic. Furthermore, Croatia’s performance is better than the average for EU-
10 countries in terms of all the other available indicators: standardized death rates; inci-
dence of tuberculosis; maternal, infant and child mortality rates.7
Unlike many other former socialist countries, Croatia does not have an acute over-
capacity problem in terms of intermediate output indicators. Croatia’s ratios of hospital 
beds and physicians per 1,000 inhabitants and the health worker density index (6, 2, and 
8, respectively) are at or lower than the averages for EU-15 countries (6, 3, and 13, res-
pectively), and are lower than the averages for EU-10 (7, 3, and 10, respectively) and 
OECD countries (6, 3, 13, respectively). Moreover, Croatia’s ratio of in-patient admissi-
on per 100 is also below the averages for EU-10, EU-15, and OECD countries (Table 2). 
However, anecdotal evidence suggests that there are underutilized capacities in subur-
ban and rural areas. 
However, significant challenges remain. First, the health care system is not financi-
ally sustainable and runs persistent deficits: at end-2006, the stock of health sector arre-
6 According to WHO Europe (2008), tuberculosis is a “disease of particular concern for public health in the WHO 
European region,” and, despite progress in reducing the incidence of the disease in recent years, “the level of TB con-
trol is still inadequate” (http://www.euro.who.int/tuberculosis/publications/20071204_4).).
7 Results for the EU-10 are heavily influenced by the results for Bulgaria and Romania, which have significant-
ly worse results than the other new EU members. But Croatia’s performance is still slightly better than the averages 
for the other EU-10 countries.293
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Table 2 Selected Real Health Resourcesa
Hospital 
Beds 
(per 1,000)
Physicians 
(per 1,000)
Health 
Worker 
Density Index 
(per 1,000)
Pharmacists 
(per 100,000)
Doctors’ 
Consultations 
(per capita)
Bed 
Occupancy 
Rate, 
Acute Care 
Hospitals 
(percent)
In-patient 
Care 
Admissions 
(per 100)
Average 
Length 
of Stay 
(all 
hospi-
tals)
Immu-
nization, 
Measles 
(percent of 
children 
ages 12-23 
months)
Croatia 5.6 2.4 7.7 55.8 x 88.1 16.6 10.3 96.0
Bulgaria 6.3 3.6 8.3 12.5 x x 21.0 8.1 96.0
Czech Republic 8.8 3.5 13.4 56.3 13.0 74.6 22.1 10.8 97.0
Estonia 6.0 3.2 9.8 62.6 x 68.4 19.2 8.0 96.0
Hungary 7.8 3.2 11.9 52.7 12.1 75.7 25.5 8.1 99.0
Latvia 7.8 3.0 8.2 x x x 22.1 10.0 95.0
Lithuania 8.7 4.0 12.4 70.2 x 78.6 23.8 10.2 97.0
Poland 5.6 2.5 7.7 58.1 5.9 x 17.6 6.9 98.0
Romania 6.6 1.9 6.2 4.8 x x 24.6 8.0 97.0
Slovak Republic 7.2 3.1 10.6 49.0 12.7 68.6 18.5 8.9 98.0
Slovenia 5.0 2.3 9.4 42.5 x 70.1 17.6 7.1 94.0
EU-8 average 7.1 3.1 10.4 55.9 10.9 72.7 20.8 8.7 96.8
EU-10 average 7.0 3.0 9.8 45.4 10.9 72.7 21.2 8.6 96.7
EU-15 average 5.5 3.2 13.0 82.5 5.9 74.3 17.9 8.4 90.1
OECD average 6.1 3.0 12.5 74.4 6.9 76.2 18.6 8.4 91.6
a Data are for the latest year available except for data on doctors’ consultations, which are avera-
ges over 2002-03, and data on immunizations, which are for 2005.
Sources: WHO; and World Bank, World Development Indicators database.
ars exceeded 1 percent of GDP (World Bank, 2007b). While some of these arrears were   
repaid in 2007, reform measures have been insufficient to harden budget constraints. Se-
cond, Croatia’s public spending on health care in proportion to GDP is one of the highest 
in the region, so Croatia’s good performance in comparison to the EU-10 comes at a high 
cost. In particular, Croatia spends about 8 percent of its GDP on health care, which is hi-
gher than any of the EU-10 countries except Slovenia (Table 1). Moreover, about 84 per-
cent of health care spending comes from public sources. For comparison, while EU-15 
countries, on average, spend more on health care than Croatia, much larger shares of their 
spending are privately financed (Figure 1). Thus, in terms of public health care spending, 
Croatia’s expenditure in percent of GDP is among the highest in Europe. Third, populati-
on aging is likely to exert further upward pressure on public finances, including through 
spending on health care. Fourth, compared with the averages for EU-15 countries, Cro-
atia performed worse in terms of all the available outcome indicators. Gaps with EU-15 
countries are large especially in terms of standardized mortality rates for non-commu-
nicable diseases (cardio-vascular diseases, cancer, injuries, chronic respiratory diseases, 
diabetes, etc.). 
High and increasing public health spending reflects both strong demand and supply 
inefficiencies: 294
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Figure 1   The Share of Private Funding in Total Health Care Spending in Croatia Is 
One of the Smallest In the Region, Average 2001-04
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0
Croatia spends 831 PPP dollars per apita 
on health of which 143, or 16 %, comes 
from private sources.
Bulgaria
Romania
Latvia
Estonia
Poland
Lithuania
Slovak Republic
Croatia
Hungary
Czech Republic
Slovenia
EU-8 average
EU-10 average
EU-15 average
public health expenditures private health expenditures
Source: WHO; and authors’ estimates.
•   The old-age dependency ratio (ratio of population aged 65 and older, which requires 
more health care than younger generations, to population aged 17-64) in Croatia is 
one of the highest in the region. Moreover, this ratio is projected to increase from 26 
percent in 2006 to 48 percent in 2051 (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2006).  
•   Under the existing health insurance system, low rates of co-payments in combina-
tion with widespread exemptions from contributions have boosted the demand for 
health services.8 The coverage of the basic benefit package is very broad, while me-
dical services essentially become free for 600,000 people who have supplementary 
insurance offered by the HZZO, as this insurance pays for co-payments. Indeed, the 
share of co-payments in total health spending is less than 1 percent, compared with 
the 7-33 percent in Western European countries.9 Around 1,900 types of drugs on 
the so-called A list are fully paid by the HZZO, while 300 types of drugs on the so-
8 See Mihaljek (2007), World Bank (2007a). Twenty groups of people, including pensioners, unemployed, and 
students, are exempt from paying contributions. Only around 35 percent of the population pays contributions (IMF, 
2008). 
9 See Funding Health Care by Mossialos et al. (2002) for a description of cost sharing in Europe. Several coun-
tries, including Australia, Canada, and Switzerland, do not allow supplementary insurance to cover co-payments asso-
ciated with services paid for by the health insurance fund. 295
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Figure 2 Share of Population Aged 65 and Older in total Population, 2006
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Source: Eurostat; and Central Bureau of Staistics of Croatia
called B list are partially paid by the HZZO.10 While the government introduced a 
flat administrative fee of 10 kuna per person (with a cap of 30 kuna per month) in 
2005, its impact on demand for health services has been weakened by exemptions 
from these fees. The government has decided to abolish this fee in 2008. 
•   The system of capacity- and input-based payments to hospitals has encouraged hos-
pitals to keep beds full and extend the length of patients’ stay (World Bank, 2007a 
and Mihaljek, 2007). Thus, the system does not provide needed incentives for hos-
pital managers to cut costs, which is likely to have contributed to the long avera-
ge length of stay in (all) hospitals (ALOS) in Croatia: at about 10.3 days, ALOS in 
Croatia was one of the longest in Europe in 2005 (compared with 8.6 days in EU-
10 countries and 8.4 days in EU-15 countries). Although ALOS has recently fallen 
significantly, it is still high compared to other countries.11
•   A substantial share of the care at the primary level is provided by costly speciali-
sts. This outcome is mainly due to the fact that primary-care physicians, who are 
supposed to play the role of “gatekeepers” of the health system, are paid on a capi-
tation-basis (that is, physicians are paid flat fees per patient per year). This approa-
ch provides an incentive for physicians to sign up as many patients as possible and 
refer them to specialists instead of treating them. 
10 These lists were introduced in 2006. For drugs on the B list, the HZZO pays a reference price for drugs on 
the A list and consumers pay the difference between the sale and reference prices. As a result of strong bargaining, 
pharmaceutical spending was reduced by about 2 percent in 2007, despite a 6 percent increase in consumption of 
drugs (IMF, 2008).   
11 Over a third of total health care spending in Croatia finances hospital (in-patient) care (IMF, 2008).296
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Figure 3 Average Length of Stays in Hospitals (days)
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average over 2002-03 and immunization from 2004.
Sources: WHO; and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database.
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•   There is little competition among health care providers. Of the 66 hospitals, only 3 
were privately owned in 2006. Private institutions are largely limited to the provi-
sion of specialized medical services.   
In all, without reforms, health care expenditures will increase significantly. The au-
thorities’ latest Pre-accession Economic Program envisages an increase of 4 percentage 
points of GDP in public health spending from 2005 to 2050. This increase could be higher 
because of, for example,  underestimating the costs of new medical technology.
2.2 Education 
Croatia’s education system is, like most European and transition countries, main-
ly financed and operated by the public sector. Recognizing discrepancies both in quali-
ty and quantity aspects, the government has since 2005 been undertaking a large reform 
program, detailed in the government’s Strategic Development Framework 2006-13 and 
the Education Sector Development Plan (ESDP) 2005-10.
Croatia’s total spending on education as a share of GDP is in line with EU-10 and 
EU-15 countries, but its educational output and outcome levels are lower. In 2005, Cro-
atia spent around 5.6 % of GDP on education, similar to average spending by the EU-15 
(Table 3). Croatia’s public education spending was about 4.8 % of GDP, somewhat less 
than the averages for EU-10 and EU-15 countries (5 % of GDP and 5.4 % of GDP, respec-
tively). Thus, Croatia’s private spending (at about 0.75% of GDP) is higher than the ave-
rages for EU-10 and EU-15 countries (at about 0.4 % of GDP), notwithstanding Croatia’s 
few private schools. Private spending in Croatia is mainly on pre-school and tertiary edu-
cation. Regarding outcomes, Croatia’s school enrollment and completion rates are lower 
than those in comparator countries. In tertiary education, for example, gross enrollment 
was about 46 percent in 2006, compared to about 53 percent in the EU-10. Furthermore, 297
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Figure 4 2006 PISA Mathematics Scores
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only one third of the students at the tertiary level reportedly complete their programs, with 
an average completion rate of 6.7 years in four-year programs (World Bank, 2007a). In 
the 2006 PISA standardized test in mathematics, only Bulgaria and Romania in the EU-
10 scored worse than Croatia: out of 57 countries, Croatia ranked 36th.12 
Croatia’s student-teacher ratios in primary and secondary schools have been falling 
and are lower than those in comparator countries. Contributing to this, the number of stu-
dents fell at all levels except for tertiary education from 1990 to 2005, reflecting decli-
ning fertility rates. In addition,  during the same period, the number of full-time teachers 
increased at all levels of education except primary education, where the number remai-
ned stable. 
School infrastructure is used intensively, but teaching hours are short. About 65 per-
cent of schools have double shifts, and 8 percent of schools have triple shifts (although 
only 10 percent and 2 percent of students, respectively, attend these schools). The gover-
nment is trying to eliminate multiple-shift schools, especially those with three shifts. Re-
garding teaching hours, teachers with a fulltime position are required to teach 15-21 hours 
per week, compared with 21-24 hours per week in OECD countries.  
There are notable differences in the composition of education spending between Cro-
atia and other countries. Wages and salaries constitute a very large share of primary edu-
cation spending in Croatia (about 90 % of recurrent spending, compared with about 82 
percent in the EU-15 and 73 % in the EU-10). In primary and secondary education, Cro-
atia spends a significantly larger share on investments (22 %, compared with about 7 % 
12 The other PISA scores (science and language) are highly correlated (at 90 percent) with the PISA mathemat-
ics scores. Including them in the analysis in this paper would not significantly change the results.  298
E. Jafarov i V. Gunnarsson: Efficiency of Government Social Spending in Croatia
Financial Theory and Practice 32 (3) 289-320 (2008)
in the EU-15 and 8 percent in the EU-10; see World Bank, 2007a) which leaves a smaller 
share for spending on non-wage recurrent expenditures, including spending on books for 
libraries and laboratory equipment. In contrast, the share of investments in tertiary educa-
tion in Croatia is smaller than the share in  peer countries. Recent increases in education 
spending have gone mainly to overheads and to a growing pre-school subsector.
Decision making and financing of education is fragmented. For example, decisions 
about establishing schools are made by local governments while teachers are hired and 
financed by the central government. Coordination issues in decision making contributes 
to excess spending since local governments do not face the full costs of their decisions 
to build schools.    
Public subsidies on education mostly benefit households with higher incomes. The 
Household Budget Survey suggests that students from higher-income families receive the 
lion’s share of scholarships and rewards. In particular, the amount of scholarships and 
rewards going to students from households in the top-income quintile (that is the top 20 
percent of the income distribution) is almost 10 times higher than the amount going to stu-
dents from the bottom quintile. Two observations are relevant: (i) most scholarships and 
rewards go to students with better academic achievements; and (ii) students in this cate-
Table 3 Education Expenditure, Output, and Outcomesa
Public 
Expenditure 
on Education 
(% of GDP)
School 
Enroliment, 
Primary 
(%; net)
Primary 
Completion 
Rate (% of 
relevant age 
group)
Progression 
to 
Secondary 
School 
(%)
Pupil-
Teacher 
Ratio, 
Primary
School 
Enroliment, 
Secondary 
(%; net)
School 
Enroliment, 
Tertiary 
(%; gross)
Average 
PISA 
Mathematics
Test
Scores
Croatia 4.5 87.3 91.4 99.9 17.7 85.0 38.7 467
Bulgaria 3.8 95.1 97.6 95.9 16.7 88.5 41.1 413
Czech Republic 4.4 x 102.8 98.0 17.9 x 43.2 510
Estonia 5.6 94.1 102.4 96.2 14.1 89.7 65.1 515
Hungary 5.4 89.1 96.0 98.8 10.5 90.7 59.6 491
Latvia 5.5 87.0b 95.2 98.5 13.0 91.0b 74.3 486
Lithuania 5.6 89.4 101.5 99.2 14.7 92.9 73.2 486
Poland 5.5 97.3 100.0 98.5 12.6 90.0 61.0 495
Romania 3.5 91.9 91.5 98.0 17.5 80.8 40.2 415
Slovak Republic 4.3 x 100.3 98.2 17.7 x 36.1 492
Slovenia 6.0 97.8 108.2 99.5 15.1 94.7 73.7 504
EU-8 average 5.3 92.4 100.8 98.4 14.4 91.5 60.8 497
EU-10 average 5.0 92.7 99.5 98.1 15.0 89.8 56.8 481
EU-15 average 5.6 98.2 97.2 99.5 13.8 91.2 62.2 498
OECD average 5.5 97.5 99.2 99.3 14.7 90.9 62.2 504
aData are for the latest year available except for data on primary completion rates, which are ave-
rages over 2003-04, and data on public education spending and progression to secondary, which are 
averages over 2001-03.
bFund staff estimates, based on gross enrollment rates.
Sources: UNESCO; and World Bank, World Development Indicators database.299
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gory tend to come from families in the top-income quintile, which can spend more money 
to support education. Students from the top-income quintile also benefit from other subsi-
dies, such as free books, dormitories, and transportation. 
2.3 Social Protection
Croatia maintains a comprehensive and complex system of social protection. The sy-
stem serves multiple objectives and includes support to war veterans and their families, 
population policy measures, social assistance to low-income groups, and a large number 
of other social assistance programs. The administration of social benefits is highly fra-
gmented, with insufficient coordination among the different levels of government provi-
ding these services. 
Overall, the system has been effective in reducing poverty. Croatia’s poverty rate is 
low by international standards, but is stagnant despite strong economic growth, thus requ-
iring attention. In 2004, about 11 % of the population was considered poor and another 
10 % was at risk of poverty (World Bank, 2007a).   
Spending on social protection is high by regional standards, but only a small share is 
spent on direct poverty alleviation. In 2007, the government spent about 4.5 % of GDP 
on social assistance and social benefits (other than those covered under social-security), 
but only about 0.6 percent of GDP of this money is used for poverty-related social assi-
stance programs. Most programs target specific categories such as war veterans, the di-
sabled, and parents and children. However, there is no database on recipients of various 
social protection benefits capable of preventing double-dipping and improving the tar-
geting of benefits.  
3 The Relative Efficiency of Social Spending
This section carries out the data envelopment analysis (DEA), discusses possible 
explanatory factors behind cross-country differences in efficiency, and highlights poten-
tial reforms to enhance efficiency. As noted earlier, the analysis generates a best-practice 
frontier of input-output combinations (e.g. social spending and outcomes) that dominate 
the other combinations in the sample, and countries that are not on the frontier are then 
ranked according to the distance from the frontier. Similarly as in  Verhoeven et al. (2007), 
a correlation analysis is also conducted to understand reasons for variation in efficiency 
across countries in the health and education sectors. Finally, in highlighting potential ef-
ficiency-enhancing reforms, the section draws on the findings in the World Bank’s Pu-
blic Finance Review. 13 Data are drawn from Eurostat, OECD, WHO, UNESCO, and the 
World Bank’s database on World Development Indicators. Spending data are adjusted to 
internationally comparable purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. 
3.1 Health Care
The results of the DEA suggest significant inefficiencies in Croatia’s public heal-
th spending and, correspondingly, significant room to rationalize public spending witho-
13 The sequencing of possible reforms and related political economy issues are beyond the scope of this paper.    300
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Table 4   Relative Efficiency of Croatia and the EU-10 in Health (Distribution by 
percentile of the ranking of efficiency scores)a,b
Percentiles
1 – 25 26 – 50 51 – 75 76 – 100
Public expenditures
Bulgaria Croatia Hungary
Czech Republic Estonia Lithuania
Latvia Poland
Slovak Republic 
Slovenia
Romania
Public and private expenditures
Bulgaria Croatia Lithuania Hungary
Czech Republic Estonia Slovenia Latvia
Poland Romania
Slovak Republic 
a Croatia’s efficiency scores for public expenditures ranked, on average, at the 63rd percentile of the 
overall ranking of officiency scores in the sample of OECD and EU-10 countries and Cyprus, Malta and 
Croatia. This places Croatia in the third (51-75) quartile of the sample ranking distribution. The rankin-
gs are based on the point estimate of the bias-corrected output-oriented efficieny scores.
b Based on public and overall (public and private) spending and associated outcome indicators 
including infant-, child-, and maternal-mortality rates; standardized death rates; the incidence of tuber-
culosis; and healthy life expectancy.
Sources: WHO; World Bank, World Development Indicators; and author’s estimates.
ut sacrificing, rather,  potentially improving, health outcomes. In terms of the efficiency 
scores for public spending of OECD and EU-10 countries (37 countries), Croatia ranks 
in the 63rd percentile. Reflecting low private health expenditures in Croatia, it ranks in 
the 48th percentile for total spending on health (Table 4). With respect to individual out-
come indicators, Croatia’s ranking is in the last quartile for the standardized death rates 
(SDR) and incidence of tuberculosis; in the third quartile for HALE, the child mortali-
ty rate, and infant mortality rate; and in the second quartile for maternal mortality rates 
(Table 4; Figure 2). 
Inefficiencies in the Croatian health care system occur mostly in the process of tran-
sforming intermediate resources into health outcomes. In addition to estimating efficien-
cy from health spending to outcomes (e.g. infant mortality rates) as above, we also esti-
mate efficiency from intermediate outputs (e.g. hospital beds) to outcomes (e.g. infant 
mortality rates), with a view to understanding the stage at which (production) inefficien-
cies occur (called system efficiency hereafter; see also Appendix I). As can be seen from 
Table 5, system efficiency is relatively low in Croatia. This is only in part related to long 
stays in hospitals. As the two first columns in Table 5 suggest, there are other inefficien-
cies in the system: the system efficiency using ALOS-to-outcome combinations is signi-
ficantly worse than in EU-15 countries. 
The results of correlation analysis suggest that relative efficiency is associated with a 
wide range of factors (Table 6). The key correlations include adverse relationships between 301
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efficiency on the one hand, and on the other (1) exogenous and lifestyle factors such as 
alcohol consumption; (2) spending on collective care and administration; (3) spending on 
pharmaceuticals; (4) doctors’ wages; (5) the number of doctor consultations, in-care ad-
missions, and outpatient contacts; and (6) length of stays in hospitals (although only we-
akly).14, 15 Moreover, out-of-pocket payment is strongly associated with increased relati-
ve efficiency in the sample. These results suggest that inefficiencies in health spending in 
14 This analysis does not provide estimates of causality. It is possible that causality goes the other way around 
or both ways. The small sample size precludes regression analysis in the second-stage.
15 Given the close relationship of spending and outcomes with income levels, correlations of efficiency scores 
and associated factors are conditional on GDP. GDP per capita is adversely related to efficiency since many of the fac-
tors that are associated with efficiency are also closely related to income level. In order to avoid attribution of factors 
whose effects on the variation in efficiency cannot be separated from the effect of GDP, only GDP per capita and fac-
tors that are correlated with efficiency independently of GDP per capita are considered in the second-stage analysis 
of this paper. The association with efficiency of factors that are strongly correlated with GDP is assessed by regress-
ing the efficiency score on both GDP and the associated factor.
Table 5   Ratio of Percentile Rank of Efficiency Scores in Health to the Average of 
Percentile Ranks for OECD Countriesa
System Efficiencyb Overall Efficiencyc
Intermediary 
inputs/outputs to 
outcomes
Average length of 
stay to outcomes
Public 
expenditures to 
outcomes
Public and private 
expenditures to 
outcomes
Croatia 1.6 1.7 1.2 0.9
Bulgaria 2.0 2.2 0.5 0.5
Czech Republic 1.4 1.1 0.9 0.7
Estonia 1.9 2.1 1.5 0.7
Hungary 1.9 1.9 1.6 1.5
Latvia 2.2 2.4 1.0 1.4
Lithuania 2.1 2.2 1.7 1.2
Poland 1.7 1.8 1.1 0.5
Romania 2.2 2.4 1.4 0.6
Slovak Republic 1.8 1.8 1.2 0.5
Slovenia 1.0 1.4 1.1 1.1
EU-10 average 1.8 1.9 1.2 0.9
EU-15 average 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.1
aRatio of bias-corrected output-oriented efficiency rankings of countries to the average ranking of 
OECD countries. Higher numbers suggest inefficiencies compared to the OECD average. For exam-
ple, high numbers for Croatia and most EU-10 countries in the first column mean that there are signi-
ficant inefficiencies in these countries in the process of transforming intermediary inputs into health 
outcomes. 
bBased on bias-corrected output-oriented efficiency rankings using, as inputs, the average of vari-
ous intermediate inputs/outputs and, as production, various outcome indicators.
cBased on bias-corrected output-oriented efficiency rankings using, as inputs, the average of vari-
ous intermediate inputs/outputs and, as production, various outcome indicators.
Sources: WHO; World Bank, World Development Indicators database; and Fund staff estimates.302
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Croatia may in part be related to high pharmaceutical spending, long stays in hospitals, 
low levels of out-of-pocket spending and of private participation.16
The above results suggest that system efficiency can be improved by containing de-
mand for health services and changing the mix of resources spent on health care. The fo-
llowing reforms, including those already underway or planned by the Croatian authoriti-
es17, could greatly improve the efficiency of health care spending:
•   increasing co-payments could help contain demand for health care spending and ge-
nerate significant budgetary savings. For example, if the level of private co-financing 
was raised to 7 percent of total health spending (one of the lowest co-payments-to-
total-health-spending ratios of the Western European countries), through increases 
in co-payment rates and/or eliminating exemptions from co-payments, this could 
generate budgetary savings of 0.5 percent of GDP. Increasing the share of the pri-
vate sector in financing sick leave and reducing the replacement rates would also 
significantly curb demand and public spending for health services.18 Restricting the 
basic benefit package provided by the HZZO would enhance the impact of this me-
asure.19 It should be noted, however, that co-payments could curtail access to the 
system for lower-income families. To prevent this possibility, means-testing could 
be used to grant limited exemptions (e.g. pensioners are currently exempt, but some 
of them may not need to be subsidized). 
•   phasing out public supplementary insurance provided by the HZZO would reduce 
demand for health care services and stimulate the provision of additional insurance 
by private participants. The equity impact of this measure is not likely to be signi-
ficant because essential services are covered by basic insurance.
•   restraining demand for pharmaceuticals by increasing the share paid by consumers 
and exposing producers to more competition could further reduce pharmaceutical 
spending. The former could be achieved through reducing the number of medici-
nes on the A-list, while the latter could be achieved through determining the spe-
cific drugs to be subsidized for each illness by periodic competitive tenders. Str-
engthening incentives to prescribe/use generic substitutes would also help reduce 
drug spending.   
•   accelerating reforms to introduce performance-based payments instead of input- or 
capacity-based payments would help curb excess spending. While the government 
has introduced case-based payments on a pilot basis, the effectiveness of this ini-
tiative has been weakened by options provided to hospitals to opt out of the new 
16 Data from the World Bank World Development Indicators database suggest that in 2005 out-of-pocket spend-
ing in percent of total (private and public) health care spending in Croatia (at 17.6 %) was lower than in both the EU-
10 (25.2 %) and the EU-15 (19.4 %). Using data from the HZZO, HANFA, and WHO, Mihaljek (2007) estimates 
out-of-pocket expenditure as a percentage of total health care in Croatia, the EU-10, and the EU-15 in 2003 at 16 per-
cent, 23 %, and 18 %, respectively.  
17 The Croatian government adopted the National Health Care Development Strategy 2006-11 to enhance and 
secure better-quality health care for citizens. The strategy includes both system reforms and financing reforms.
18 About 6 percent of the labor force was on sick leave in 2005; anecdotal evidence suggests that sick leave is 
used to deal with excess employment at the business level. 
19 Moreover, restricting the basic benefit package would stimulate private participation in the provision of addi-
tional insurance.   303
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Figure 5   Efficiency Frontiers for Selected Health Outcome Indicators - Croatia’s 
efficiency scores for HALE, the child mortality rate, infant mortality rate, and 
incidence of tuberculosis are among the lowest in the sample
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payment system that essentially guarantees highest prices for services of hospitals. 
The authorities intend to introduce the so-called Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG) 
payment method in all hospitals treating acute diseases in late 2008. These measu-
res would facilitate reducing the length of stays in hospitals and could generate si-
gnificant budgetary savings over the medium term. 
•   Restructuring the system by moving more resources to more affordable outpatient 
care could also generate significant savings. Reforms to the payment system to str-305
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engthen incentives of general practitioners to treat patients rather than to refer them 
to specialists, as well as increases in co-payments for inpatient care, would serve this 
purpose. Administrative measures such as requesting general practitioners to explain 
the reasons for their referrals could also help reduce referrals to specialists.  
Sources: WHO; World Bank; authors’ estimate306
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Table 6 Correlations of Relative Efficiency in Health with Associated Factorsa
 Healthy 
Life 
Expectancy
Standar-
dized 
Death Rate
Infant 
Mortality 
Rate
Child 
Mortality 
Rate
Maternal 
Mortality 
Rate
Incidence 
of Tuber-
culosis
Overall efficiency: public expenditures to outcomes
Exogenous factors
   Alcohol intake (liters per capita per year) NN NN N
   Average schooling years in the population NN NN
   GINI Index N N
Expenditure composition
     Collective care expenditure (percent of public 
health exp.)c NN NN
   Collective care expenditure (PPP per capita)c NN NN
     Out-of-pocket expenditure (percent of private 
health exp.) PP P P P
   Doctors’ wages (percent of GDP) NN NN
Health resources 
   MRIs per million capita P P P
Overall efficiency: public and private expenditures to outcomes
Exogenous factors
   GDP per capita (PPP dollars) NN NN NN NN
   GINI Index NN NN
   Average schooling years in the population NN N
Expenditure composition
   Pharmaceutical expenditure (PPP per capita)c NN NN
     Collective care expenditure (percent of total health 
exp.)c NN NN
   Collective care expenditure (PPP per capita)c NN NN
   Personal care expenditure (PPP per capita)c NN NN
     Administration and insurance (percent of total 
health exp.)c NN NN N
   Administration and insurance (PPP per capita)c NN NN
     Out-of-pocket expenditure (percent of private 
health exp.) PP PP PP
   Doctors’ wages (percent of GDP) NN NN N
System efficiency: intermediate resources/services to outcomes
Exogenous factors
   GDP per capita (PPP dollars) PP PP PP PP P PP
     Population over 65 years (percent of total 
population) PP
Expenditure composition
     Pharmaceutical expenditure (percent of total 
health exp.)c NN NN NN NN NN
     Administration and insurance (percent of public 
health exp.)c NN NN NN NN NN
Health resourcesb
   Doctors’ consultations per capita per year NN NN N NN
   In-patient care admissions per 100 capitad NN NN NN NN N
   Outpatient contacts per capita per yeard NN
   Average length of stay at hospital NN307
E. Jafarov i V. Gunnarsson: Efficiency of Government Social Spending in Croatia
Financial Theory and Practice 32 (3) 289-320 (2008)
Rationalizing the network of hospitals would allow Croatia significantly to impro-
ve the efficiency of health care spending and generate budgetary savings in the medium 
to long term. This would require developing a master plan by assessing the needs of the 
population by type of service and geographic location and identifying potential areas for 
efficiency gains. The master plan should also include closing some facilities, reorienting 
some facilities for alternative uses such as long-term care and private sector practice, and 
improving the infrastructure and upgrading equipment in the remaining facilities. 
The efficiency of health spending could be significantly increased by improving the 
management of health institutions and introducing more competition into healthcare mar-
kets. Mihaljek (2007) notes that “virtually the entire secondary and tertiary health care sec-
tors are managed by physicians, who often lack the adequate training in strategic mana-
gement, financial planning, and other skills necessary for hospital management in a com-
petitive market environment.” Furthermore, there are coordination issues among different 
government agencies, leading to inefficiencies. For example, while hospitals are managed 
by local governments, staff hiring is done at the central government level. Accordingly, 
giving more independence to hospitals, imposing hard budget constraints on them, brin-
ging in professional management expertise, and exposing them to competition could help 
significantly reduce inefficiencies in the health care sector. In this regard, a privatization 
program of hospitals should be considered in the context of the master plan. 
Finally, stepping up efforts to prevent diseases (beyond immunizations   covered in the 
above DEA analysis) would also help enhance efficiency and contain costs.  For example, 
the share of overweight people in Croatia is among the highest in the Europe, which may 
be one of the factors of high incidences of death from circulatory system and heart disea-
ses.20 Smoking-related death incidences are also significantly higher than in EU-15 coun-
tries, as well as in Slovenia and the Czech Republic (Table 7), suggesting that increasing 
people’s awareness of a healthy lifestyle could help reduce health care spending.  
20 The share of obese people in Croatia is almost double the average of the EU-15. Mihaljek (2007) mentions an 
unhealthy lifestyle (high alcohol and tobacco consumption, and prevalence of physical inactivity) as the likely reason 
for the difference in mortality rates for non-communicable diseases between Croatia and EU-15 countries. 
a Correlations are run on bias-corrected output-oriented efficiency scores. This table summarizes 
the results of correlations of associated factors with the level of efficiency. PP (P) indicates that the asso-
ciated factor is positively correlated with level of efficiency (negatively correlated with output-oriented 
efficiency scores) at the 5 (10) percent significance level. NN (N) indicates that the associated factor is 
negatively correlated with level of efficiency (positively correlated with output-oriented efficiency scores) 
at the 5 (10) percent significance level. Several of the associated factors are highly correlated with GDP. 
Only correlations that are significant after conditioning on GDP are considered (see Appendix I).
b Only real health resources/services not included in the DEA (hospital beds, number of physicians, 
health workers, pharmacists, and measles immunization rate are included in the DEA) are considered.
c Excludes non-OECD countries due to missing data.
d Excludes non-European OECD countries due to missing data.
Sources: WHO; World Bank; OECD; and authors’ estimates.308
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3.2 Education
The analysis suggests significant inefficiencies in the education sector (Table 8). In 
terms of the efficiency scores, Croatia ranks in the third quartile for primary education 
and secondary education (as well as in terms of PISA test scores);21 and in the last quar-
tile for tertiary education. For tertiary education, this inefficiency is related to low enro-
llment and graduation rates. For secondary education, this low ranking reflects mainly low 
enrollment rates and relatively low PISA scores (in mathematics), and in primary educa-
tion the inefficiencies stem from low enrollment, low completion rates, and high overhe-
ad costs related to the excess number of schoolteachers, which has not matched the dec-
lining school-age population. 
As in the health care sector, the main inefficiencies in the Croatian education sector 
lie in transforming intermediate education outputs into real outcomes. As can be seen from 
Table 9, Croatia’s system efficiency from secondary enrollment to PISA scores was worse 
than the EU-10 average and significantly worse than the OECD average.22 These results 
suggest that there is significant scope for streamlining education expenditures in Croatia 
and that the education system could be improved by relevant policy reform. 
Correlation analysis of efficiency of education spending is revealing (Table 10). The 
key findings include a positive relationship between overall efficiency on the one hand, 
and on the other (1) the share of current expenditure in total education; (2) classroom size; 
(3) parent’s education; and (4) school quality and autonomy indicators such as student 
21 Efficiency in secondary education is estimated using both a combined set of secondary intermediary outputs 
and outcomes, and PISA scores only.
22 System efficiency was estimated only for the secondary education level, where PISA test scores were used as 
education outcome. The overall public sector efficiency (quartile) rankings in the primary and secondary levels pre-
sented in Table 7 are for the first stage of the production process (spending to intermediary outputs), since no educa-
tion outcomes such as test scores are available at these levels. 
Table 7   Standardized Death Rates, all ages, 2005 (per 100,00)
All Causes Circulatory 
System
Ischemic 
Heart 
Diseases
Alcohol-
Related 
Causes
Smoking-
Related 
Causes
Cancer of 
the Cervix
Czech Republic 886.9 435.8 167.9 90.5 380.9 3.5
Estonia 837.6 419.0 177.5 81.0 359.3 5.3
Hungary 993.6 498.2 264.2 158.3 448.6 6.8
Latvia 1,015.5 502.4 261.3 129.5 490.5 6.5
Lithuania 1,107.2 578.7 287.0 157.2 532.2 6.6
Poland 1,081.6 562.8 355.0 190.8 548.1 9.8
Slovak Republic 862.4 384.2 114.4 89.5 293.1 7.8
Slovenia 945.0 508.7 268.3 90.6 414.1 6.8
Croatia 729.4 288.0 80.2 93.8 215.7 2.7
EU-8 average 946.5 467.8 226.0 123.8 412.7 6.5
EU-15 average 606.2 213.7 82.3 57.9 200.3 2.2
Soruce: WHO, European Health for All database.309
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admission prerequisites, student discipline and principal responsibility for hiring. Also, 
note that the coefficient of correlation between GDP per capita and overall efficiency has 
a minus sign while the coefficient of correlation between system efficiency and GDP per 
capita has a plus sign. This perhaps reflects the fact that rich countries spend more money 
on education and health – due mainly to high costs for intermediary output – but causing 
only marginal improvements in outcomes. However, these countries are more efficient in 
transforming intermediate output into outcome. There are two implications for Croatia. 
First, more spending, especially capital spending, will not automatically improve educa-
Table 8   Relative Efficiency of Croatia and the EU-10 in Education (distribution by 
percentiles of the ranking of efficiency scores)a
Percentiles
1-25 26-50 51-75 76-100
Primary educationb
Romania Bulgaria Croatia
Czech Republic Estonia
Lithuania Hungary
Slovak Republic Latvia
Poland
Slovenia
Secondary educationc
Bulgaria Estonia Croatia
Lithuania Hungary Czech R.
Poland Latvia
Romania Slovak Republic
Slovenia
PISA test scores
Estonia Czech Republic Bulgaria
Poland Latvia Croatia
Romania Lithuania Hungary
Slovak Republic 
Slovenia
Tertiary educationd
Latvia Estonia Hungary Bulgaria
Lithuania Croatia
Poland Czech  Republic
Slovenia Romania
Slovak Republic
aCroatia’s efficiency scores for primary education ranked, on average, at the 70th percentile of the 
overall ranking of efficiency scores in the sample of OECD and EU-10 countries and Cyprus, malta and 
Croatia. This places Croatia in the third (51-75) quartile of the sample ranking distribution. The ran-
kings are based on the point estimate of the output-oriented efficiency scores.
bBased on primary expenditure efficiency in producing primary enrollment, primar pupil-teacher 
ratio, primary completion rates and progression to secondary education.
cBased on secondary expenditure efficiency in producing secondary enrollment, upper secondary 
graduation rates, and averages PISA mathematics scores.
dBased on tertiary expenditure effieincy in producing tertiary enrollment.
Sources: UNESCO; World Bank; and author’s estimates.310
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tion outcomes. Second, the costs of having an excess number of teachers will rise signi-
ficantly as teachers’ wages grow in line with income levels.    
The following reforms, which are largely consistent with many reform measures in-
cluded in the ESDP, could help improve the efficiency of education spending:
•   Rationalizing the teaching force would help contain declines in the student-teacher 
ratio, as well as related fiscal costs and rigidities that limit the scope for discretio-
nary cuts in short-term education spending. This could be achieved through natural 
attrition and a selective hiring freeze for new teachers. If Croatia’s student-teacher 
ratios could be increased to the levels of OECD countries, it would allow the country 
to reduce the number of teaching staff by around 11 percent at the primary level and 
by around 17 percent at the secondary level. In this regard, World Bank (2007a) su-
ggests that the number of students 7-29 years of age will decline by another 358,000 
or about 25 percent from 2005 to 2030. This implies a significant potential for savin-
gs, if the number of teachers and overall education spending can be reduced in line. 
Also, as the number of students decline, schools could consider pooling resources 
by sharing teachers. Otherwise, further declines in the student-teacher ratio would 
lead to significant inefficiencies and aggravate the fiscal burden.  
•   Rationalizing the school network would also help realize potential benefits from 
expected declines in the number of students. This could be facilitated by increases 
in spending on transportation and the usage of multi-grade teaching in small scho-
Table 9   Ratio of Percentile Rank of Efficiency Scores in Education to the percentile 
Rank of the Average Efficiency Score of the OECDa
System Efficiency Overall Efficiencyb
Secondary enrollment rate
to PISA scores
Total education expenditures
to PISA scores 
Croatia 1.9 1.3
Bulgaria 2.3 1.0
Czech Republic x 0.8
Hungary 1.4 1.0
Latvia 1.7 0.5
Lithuania 1.7 0.7
Poland 2.2 0.1
Romania 2.2 0.1
Slovak Republic x 0.4
Slovenia 1.1 0.3
EU-8 average 1.6 0.5
EU-10 average 1.8 0.5
EU-15 average 1.1 1.2
aRatio of output-oriented efficiency rankings of EU-10 and EU-15 countries to the average ranking 
of OECD countries. Higher numbers suggest inefficiencies, compared to OECD countries.
bBased on output-oriented efficiency rankings from Table 8.
Sources: UNESCO; World Bank; and Fund staff estimates.311
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Table 10 Correlations of Relative Efficiency in Education with Associated Factorsa 
Primary Secondary Tertiary
 
Enroll-
ment 
rate
Comple-
tion 
rate
Pupil-
teacher 
ratio
Enrol-
ment 
rate
Gradua-
tion 
rate
PISA 
math 
scores
Enroll-
ment
 rate
Overall efficiency: public expenditures to outputs/outcomes
Exogenous factors
  GDP per capita (PPP dollars) NN NN NN
  Healthy life expectancy (years) PP PP
    Mother’s education ICED 3 or higher 
(percent students)b ... ... ... PP P P ...
    Father’s education ICED 3 or higher 
(percent students)b ... ... ... PP P ...
Expenditure composition
    Private education expenditure 
(as a share of public educ. exp.) NN
    Total current expenditure (percent of 
non-tertiary educ. exp.) P PP PP ...
    Total capital expenditure (percent of 
non-tertiary educ. exp.) N N N ...
Education resources
  Pupil-teacher ratio in secondaryc ... ... ... PP ...
    Student admission record is 
prerequisite (percent schools)b ... ... ... PP ...
    Principal is responsible for hiring teachers 
(percent schools)b ... ... ... P PP ...
    Student absenteeism hinders learning 
(percent schools)b ... ... ... NN ...
    Student skipping classes hinders learning 
(percent schools)b ... ... ... NN ...
    Student lack ofrespect hinders learning 
(percent schools)b ... ... ... N ...
    Student bullying hinders learning
(percent schools) b ... ... ... NN ...
System efficiency: secondary enrollment/PISA math scores
Exogenous factors
  GDP per capita (PPP dollars) ... ... ... ... ... PP ...
  Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) ... ... ... ... ... NN ...
Education resourcesb
    Student admission record is prerequisite 
(percent schools)b ... ... ... ... ... P ...
    Student absenteeism hinders learning 
(percent schools)b ... ... ... ... ... NN ...
    Student skipping classes hinders learning 
(percent schools)b ... ... ... ... ... NN ...
    Student lack of respect hinders learning 
(percent schools)b ... ... ... ... ... N ...
a Correlations were run on output-oriented efficiency scores. This table summarizes the results of correlations of asso-
ciated factors with the level of efficiency. PP (P) indicates that the associated factor is positively correlated with level of effi-
ciency (negatively correlated with output-oriented efficiency scores) at the 5 (10) percent significance level. NN (N) indicates 
that the associated factor is negatively correlated with level of efficiency (positively correlated with output-oriented efficien-
cy scores) at the 5 (10) percent level. Several of the associated factors are highly correlated with GDP. Only correlations that 
are significant after conditioning on GDP are considered (see Appendix I).
b Only covers countries that participated in the 2003 PISA test.
c Excludes non-OECD countries due to missing data.
Sources: UNESCO; World Bank, World Development Indicators; OECD; and authors’ estimates.312
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ols. The government’s efforts to eliminate triple shifts are welcome, but attempts to 
eliminate double shifts need to be well planned to avoid unnecessary spending.  
•   Increasing teaching hours may allow for better education outcomes while containing 
education spending. This would provide room to contain the decline in the student-
teacher ratio in the event that enrollments increase. 
•   Moving toward performance- and per-capita based budgeting could significantly re-
duce inefficiencies in the education sector. The authorities have already made good 
progress toward these ends by introducing a transparent system of performance eva-
luation of students’ achievements as well as the quality of teachers. More could be 
done, however, to take into account the number of students, as well as selected out-
put and outcome indicators such as graduation and drop-out rates, student-teacher 
ratios, scores on international standardized tests. 
•   Reducing rigidities related to institutional and funding mechanisms could generate 
savings. In particular, gradually raising local governments’ control over and respon-
sibility in delivering educational services, in line with their capacity, would allow 
them to internalize the full cost of their decisions and could increase the efficiency 
of education spending.     
•   Greater cost recovery should be considered in pre-school education and university 
tuition. In pre-school education, which is under the control of local governments, 
unit costs have risen faster than the other levels of education, which may reflect 
inefficiencies in the provision of services by local governments. Regarding univer-
sity tuition, education is free for about 48 per cent of students, but a study at the 
University of Rijeka suggests that those who pay fees complete with better grades 
and earlier than other students (World Bank, 2007a). Introducing means-testing for 
programs providing free textbooks, transportation, and dormitories would help to 
better target the vulnerable groups and curb education spending without sacrificing 
education outcomes.   
More generally, improving the skills base to match that demanded by the labor mar-
ket will be important for ensuring that the Croatian economy competes successfully in 
Europe and globally. The Lisbon Council’s European Human Capital Index ranked Cro-
atia last among 12 central and eastern European countries, mainly due to low scores on 
utilization of human capital, although this study ranked Croatia in the middle of the 12 
countries for human capital endowment (i.e., education and training) and human capital 
productivity (Ederer, Schuller, and Willms, 2007). This suggests that the impact of edu-
cation spending on economic growth in Croatia could be enhanced by shifting resources 
to meet demands in the labor market better. 
3.3 Social Protection Transfers
Croatia is on the efficiency frontier line, but this is because of low levels of social 
protection spending (in PPP terms) rather than large changes in poverty reduction due to 
social protection transfers. This suggests problems in the future, unless the system is re-
formed (Figure 3). In particular, unless efficiency of social spending is improved signifi-
cantly, further increases in social spending may not lead to less poverty. 313
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Sources: Croatian Central Bureau of Statistics; Eurostat; OECD; and authors’ estimates.
Figure 6 Social Spending and Poverty Rate Reduction in Selected Countries
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The following reforms could help improve the efficiency of social protection spen-
ding:
•   Improving the targeting of benefits by significantly expanding the use of means te-
sting in providing benefits would improve the efficiency of social protection spen-
ding. The intended introduction of taxpayer identification numbers – and, more im-
portantly, to quantify the benefits received by individuals – would facilitate the in-
troduction of this measure.   
•   Consolidating supervisory responsibility under a single agency would improve the 
coordination of policies and their implementation. Unifying the administration of 
benefits to a single office at the local level with a view to eliminating possibilities 
for double-dipping could generate fiscal savings and improve efficiency.  
•   Changing the overall mix of total social spending by reducing the share of catego-
rical benefits and increasing the share of well-targeted programs could help achie-
ve better results.  
Finally, any new initiatives on social spending should be designed with a view to en-
hancing incentives to work. Croatia’s labor market participation rate is one of the lowest 
in Europe, and the existing social benefits may have contributed to this outcome. Active 
labor market measures (employment subsidies, training, measures to promote jobs for the 
disabled, etc.) and easing hiring (and firing) procedures could be considered to re-connect 
the unemployed to the labor market. 314
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4 Concluding Remarks
The previous sections demonstrated that there are significant inefficiencies in social 
spending in Croatia. In the health sector, inefficiencies are mainly related to high spen-
ding, rather than weak outcomes. In the education sector, inefficiencies are related to both 
poor outcomes and increasing overhead costs. Regarding social protection spending, ine-
fficiencies are related to weaknesses in targeting. While there are caveats to the analysis, 
the main findings, taken together with the findings of other studies, seem quite robust. 
In particular, the findings of this paper, derived from simple cross-country comparisons, 
simple correlation analyses, and DEA,23 are supported by studies at sectoral levels by the 
IMF, the World Bank, and Mihaljek (2007). 
These inefficiencies suggest that there is room to improve key social indicators while 
containing public spending. The paper has suggested a number of measures that can be 
taken to reduce inefficiencies in public spending and generate budgetary savings. These 
measures are summarized in the following frame. Some of the above reforms could have 
disproportionate effects on the poor and other vulnerable groups. Therefore, to make sure 
that  vulnerable groups are not deprived of  necessary services, targeted transfers to them 
may be needed.
Menu of Reform Measures to Increase Efficiency of Social Spending in 
Croatia
Health Care
• Increase co-payments while minimizing exemptions.
• Further reduce subsidization of pharmaceuticals. 
•   Accelerate the introduction of the Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG) payment 
method.
• Restrict the basic benefits package covered by HZZO.
• Shift resources to more affordable outpatient care.
• Increase the role of the private sector in the provision of health care services.
• Strengthen incentives for general practitioners to reduce referrals.
• Rationalize the hospital network.
Education Sector
• Rationalize the teaching and non-teaching work force and wage bill. 
•   Consider greater cost recovery in tertiary education by reducing budget 
financing to universities and means testing scholarships.
• Increase teaching hours to international norms.
•   Target free textbooks, transportation, and dormitories programs only to the 
vulnerable.
23 See Annex I for description of caveats of DEA. 315
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•   Rationalize the school network and expand multi-grade teaching in small 
schools.
• Move towards per-student or performance-based budgeting.
• Shift resources to meet demands in the labor market better.
Social Protection
• Improve targeting of benefits.
• Streamline benefits by consolidating them and reducing their number.
• Consolidate the administration of social benefits.316
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Annex I Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)24
The DEA technique is a non-parametric method of estimating production possibility 
sets, which can be used to evaluate the efficiency in the use of inputs in producing outco-
mes for a sample of production units.25 It is mostly used for estimating relative efficiency 
in business applications, but it has recently also been used to assess the relative efficien-
cy of public expenditure. In the context of government expenditure efficiency, indicators 
of public production are typically used to measure outcomes, for example, life expectan-
cy and infant mortality rates (in health care), youth literacy rates and test scores (in edu-
cation), and the number of roads and telephone lines (in infrastructure). Inputs used to 
produce these outcomes are public and private expenditure on health, education, and in-
frastructure, as well as intermediate outputs and resources such as the number of doctors 
and hospital beds (in health care) and enrollment rates and student-teacher ratio (in edu-
cation). The production units in this case are often countries, but could also be sub-nati-
onal regions.26
Figure A1 illustrates a stylized example of DEA based on a single input and outcome 
indicator across countries. The efficient frontier connects countries A to D as these units 
dominate countries E and G in the interior. The convexity assumption allows an ineffi-
cient country (point E) to be assessed relative to a hypothetical position on the frontier 
(point Z) by taking a linear combination of efficient unit pairs (points A and B). In this 
manner, an input-based technical efficiency score that is bounded between zero and one 
can be calculated as the ratio of YZ to YE. The score corresponds to the proportional re-
duction in inputs that is consistent with relatively efficient production of a given output, 
and can be interpreted as an indicator of the cost savings that could be achieved from ef-
ficiency enhancement. Similarly, an output-based technical efficiency score can be cal-
culated as the ratio of FX to EX, which reflects the improvement in outputs for given in-
puts that could be achieved from efficiency enhancement. This paper focuses on output-
based efficiency scores, since Croatia will need to improve outcomes without increasing 
expenditures.27 28 
DEA is a powerful tool to assess the relative efficiency of spending, but also has im-
portant caveats. For example, it does not require an assumption about unknown functio-
24 This Appendix is based on Zhu (2003), Mattina and Gunnarsson (2006), and Verhoeven et al. (2007). 
25 It was developed by Farrell (1959) and popularized by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978). See Zhu (2003) 
for more detailed discussion of DEA.
26 There is well-established literature using DEA to assess the relative efficiency of public expenditure. Gupta 
and Verhoeven (2001) studied the relative efficiency of education spending in a broad sample of African countries 
during the 1984-95 period. Afonso and St. Aubyn (2004) applied DEA and a related frontier-based approach on health 
and education spending in a sample of OECD countries. Herrera and Pang (2005) studied the relative efficiency of 
spending in 140 countries using DEA. Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi (2006) applied DEA in a sample of EU and 
emerging market countries. An important contribution of their work was to apply truncated regression models based 
on procedures developed by Simar and Wilson (2007) to control for exogenous factors that impact efficiency but that 
are not directly controlled by policy makers. Coelli, Lefebvre, and Pestieau (2007) applied DEA to study social pro-
tection performance in the EU. 
27 An output-based efficiency score of one corresponds to a relatively efficient country operating on the frontier. 
Scores exceeding one imply that spending could achieve better output performance. This differs from input-based 
efficiency scores that range between zero and one. 
28 The input- and output-based efficiency scores are equal assuming constant returns to scale. However, the DEA 
models considered in this paper permit variable returns to scale.317
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nal forms for the efficiency frontier or complex distributional properties for econometric 
analysis. However, it is also subject to the following caveats:
•   Results are highly sensitive to sample selection and measurement error. As a re-
sult, outliers exert large effects on the efficiency scores and the shape of the fronti-
er. For this reason, proper sample selection is the key to ensuring that cross-coun-
try input-output combinations are comparable. 
•   Spending attributes that are difficult to quantify are not easily incorporated in the 
analysis, such as the quality of spending. 
•   The outcome indicators against which inputs are evaluated may not actually be tar-
geted by policy makers. 
•   Large differences across countries in private health care or education spending could 
bias the efficiency scores of public spending, as the outcomes targeted by policy 
makers are also impacted by private spending. 
•   Factors beyond the direct control of policy makers can also affect relative efficien-
cy scores. For instance, a high incidence of AIDS would reduce the measured effi-
ciency of health spending in African compared to other countries.  
Moreover, simple DEA estimation produces biased estimates of the efficiency sco-
res that need to be corrected. In particular, the best-practice frontier can move outward, 
if efficient pairs/countries are added in the sample, but cannot move inward. This one-
sided error means that estimating the best-practice frontier with a finite sample is subject 
to bias. Since output–oriented efficiency scores are measured in relation to the frontier, 
the estimated scores are subject to the same finite sample downward bias (i.e., the level 
of efficiency is overestimated unless a correction is made for the bias). This bias stems 
from the fact that since we only observe a sub-sample of the possible outcomes represen-
ting all feasible combinations of spending and outcomes, we do not know the exact posi-
tion of the best-practice frontier. Where appropriate, corrections are made for the estima-
Figure A1 Illustrative Example of Applying DEA318
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Health Expenditure
•   public health 
expenditure
•   private health 
expenditure
Real Health Resources 
(examples)
• hospital beds
•   physicians/health 
workers
•   immunizations
•   doctors’ consultations
•   in-patient admissions
• lengths of stay
• bed occupancy rate
Health Otucomes
•   health adjusted life 
expectancy
•   standardized death rate
• infant mortality rate
• child mortality rate
•   maternal mortality rate
•   incidence of 
tuberculosis
Figure A2   The Efficiency Relationship between Health Expenditures, Resources, and 
Outcomes
Overall efficiency
Cost
effectiveness
System
efficiency
tion bias in the best-practice frontier and efficiency scores through bootstrapping, as su-
ggested by Simar and Wilson (2000).29 
DEA results can be disaggregated to assess at what stage of the spending process 
inefficiencies arise. This is done as by comparing spending efficiency (the overall mea-
sure of efficiency from spending to outcomes as discussed above) and system efficiency 
(the measure of efficiency from intermediate outputs to outcomes; Tables 5 and 9). Figu-
re A2 illustrates how it is done in the analysis of efficiency of health care spending. First, 
cost efficiency is assessed using health care spending and intermediate output indicators 
such as hospital beds, immunizations, physicians, health care workers and pharmacists 
29 A key issue is how quickly the estimated efficiency scores converge to their unbiased true values if the sample 
of observations is expanded. This convergence speed is n-2/(p+q+1), where p is the number of inputs and q is the number 
of production items. In the 1 input / 1 product examples of this Annex, the convergence speed is n-2/3. This is faster than 
the convergence speed for a standard parametric regression of n-1/2, suggesting that reasonable estimates of efficiency 
scores and confidence intervals can be reached with a lower number of observations than would be needed for standard 
regression analysis. However, the convergence speed declines exponentially as the number of inputs and production 
items is increased, and already at two inputs and production items, the speed of convergence is markedly slower than 
for a parametric regression. This implies that an expansion in the numbers of inputs and production items comes at a 
significant cost in terms of the ability to draw conclusions on efficiency from a limited number of observations.319
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per capita. Second, efficiency scores are calculated, using the intermediate output index 
as an input and associated outcomes (infant, child, and maternal mortality rates, as well 
as HALE, standardized death rates and the incidence of tuberculosis). Third, the resulting 
system efficiency rankings are averaged and expressed as a ratio of the average OECD 
ranking, and compared with similar ratios for spending efficiency.
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